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Brockington: Products Liability

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
I.

BREACH OF WARRANTY

A.

Privity

In Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., Ltd.,' the South Carolina
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Lewis, held that
sellers' express and implied warranties extend third-party beneficiary protection to natural persons who might be expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the sellers' product. 2 Interpreting
South Carolina Code section 36-2-318,1 the court dispensed with
the need for contractual privity between a component part manufacturer
and plaintiff for "injury and damage to person or prop4
erty."
Plaintiff Gasque brought an action for breach of warranty
against Eagle Machine Company, which sold him an automatic
tobacco picker, and Sperry Rand, Inc., which manufactured a
hydraulic pump that was incorporated into the picker. The trial
court granted Sperry Rand an involuntary nonsuit because of the
lack of privity between Sperry Rand and plaintiff.5 In granting
the nonsuit, the trial court relied primarily on Odom v. Ford
Motor Co.," which was decided before the enactment of section
7
36-2-318.
In Odom, plaintiff consumer brought an action for breach of
warranty against the manufacturer of a tractor. The tractor was
sold first to a distributor and then to a retailer before it reached
plaintiff.8 The court, concluding that privity was required in an
action for breach of implied warranty, stated that "the warranty
of a chattel does not run with the property but is personal to the
purchaser to whom the warranty is made.' Because there was no
privity between plaintiff and defendant, the court in Odom held
that the action could not be maintained.' 0
1. 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978).
2. Id. at 502, 243 S.E.2d at 832.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976).
4. 270 S.C. at 502, 243 S.E.2d at 832.
5. Id. at 501-02, 243 S.E.2d at 831.
6. 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).
7. Section 36-2-318, part of the Uniform Commercial Code, became effective on January 1, 1968. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-10-101 (1976).
8. 230 S.C. at 322-23, 95 S.E.2d at 602.
9. Id. at 326, 95 S.E.2d at 604.
10. Id. at 328, 95 S.E.2d at 605.
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Although a large exception to Odom was carved by
Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply," Odom has been recognized as authority in South Carolina cases.'" In Springfield, the
supreme court allowed suit by the purchasers of a hot water
heater against the wholesaler and the manufacturer of the heater,
despite the absence of privity.13 The court distinguished Odom on
the ground that there the claim was based only on economic loss,
whereas in Springfield there was personal injury and property
damage "caused by an appliance which was either inherently or
imminently dangerous."' 4
Rather than seeking to fall within the Springfieldexception,' 5
appellant Gasque argued that the intent of the legislature in passing section 36-2-318 was to abolish the requirement of privity in
actions such as his own.'6 Section 36-2-318 provides, "A seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and whose person or property is damaged by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section."' 7 Appellee Sperry Rand countered by arguing that section 36-2-318 was intended to eliminate the requirement of horizontal privity only, and not vertical privity.5
Commentators distinguish between horizontal and vertical
privity to characterize two types of relationships that can exist.'"
"Vertical privity" refers to the relationship existing between the
11. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
12. E.g., Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (D.S.C. 1974);
Nelson v. Coleman, 41 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.S.C. 1966); Salladin v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 271,
146 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1966).
13. 249 S.C. at 138, 153 S.E.2d at 187. The trial court overruled motions for dismissal;
the supreme court affirmed, stating that because of the importance of the questions
involved, they should not be decided on demurrer. Id.
14. Id. at 135, 153 S.E.2d at 186.
15. At the trial level in Gasque, the court stated, "At this time the court does not
comment upon the matter of damages other than to say that there was no testimony of
any damage to property or testimony of personal injury." Record at 24 (Written Order of
Court Granting Involuntary Nonsuit as to Defendant Sperry Rand). This language suggests that the trial court was distinguishing the facts of Gasque from those of Springfield.
16. Brief of Appellant at 4, 6-7.

17. S.C.

CODE

ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976).

18. Brief of Appellee at 6.
19. E.g., R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALEs 282 (1970); J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 327 (1972); Donovan, The Emerging Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 MAINE L. REv. 181, 218
(1967); Rapson, ProductsLiability Under ParallelDoctrines: ContrastsBetween the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RurGEns L. REv. 692, 697-98 (1965).
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parties to each of the several sales that occur as a product is
passed down the distributive chain. 21 "Horizontal privity" refers
to the relationships between the ultimate purchaser of a product
and those persons harmed by it.21 Perhaps the strongest support
for appellee Sperry Rand's position that section 36-2-318 was intended to eliminate the requirement of horizontal but not vertical
privity lies in one of the comments made by the Official Reporter
to the U.C.C.:
3. This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser.
Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons
in the distributive chain."
This comment has often been interpreted to mean that the intent
of the U.C.C. drafters was not to alter the vertical privity requirement wherever it existed in the laws of the states, but instead to
eliminate only the bar of horizontal privity, and even then only
for a specified class of beneficiaries.u The comment, however, is
not directly applicable to section 36-2-318, even though it appears
in the South Carolina Code directly following the section. 24 South
Carolina's non-uniform section 36-2-318 was developed by
20. R. NoRDsTROm, supra note 19, at 282; Donovan, supra note 19, at 218. For example, A sells to B, who then sells to C. A is in vertical privity with B, who is also in vertical
privity with C. A and C, however, are not in vertical privity.
21. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 19, at 282; Donovan, supra note 19, at 218. For example, A sells to B, who gives to C. B and C are in horizontal privity, but A is in horizontal
privity with no one.
22. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962). Also in reference to the neutrality of § 2-318 on the issue
of privity is the following portion of the South Carolina Reporter's Comments:
The Commercial Code generally takes a neutral position on the issue of
privity leaving the matter as stated in the official comments to Section 2-318 to
"the developing case law." The one factual situation which the Commercial
Code section deals with is where a member of a family buys defective goods

which are consumed by other members of the family or guests in the home
resulting in personal injury. In such case the warranty runs with the goods, thus

eliminating the privity requirement.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318, South Carolina Reporter's Comments (1976).

23. E.g., Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield, 413 F. Supp. 1069,
1088 (D. Neb. 1969); R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 19, at 284; Rapson, supra note 19, at 69798. In Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974), however, the
court interpreted the comment as making it clear that in contract actions, the requirement
of privity (impliedly both vertical and horizontal) was unaffected by § 36-2-318.
24. S.C. CODE § 36-2-318, Official Comment 3 (1976).
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amendment 5 of the uniform version of section 36-2-318 that was
proposed to the states in 1962.21 Both the Official Comment and
the South Carolina Reporter's Comment apply to the 1962 uni27
form version rather than South Carolina's amended version.
The supreme court, however, did not rely on the comments
to section 36-2-318; instead, it applied the following rule of statutory interpretation: when the words of a statute, given their ordinary meaning, are unambiguous, then there is no room for construction, and the court is required to apply the words according
25. The first amendment, on May 27, 1965, deleted the phrase "who is in the family
or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home." S.C. SEN. J. 133 (1965). The
second amendment, on March 29, 1966, changed the phrase "extends to any natural
person if it is reasonable to expect that such person may.use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person" to "extends to any natural person who may be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and whose person or property is
damaged." S.C. SEN. J. 918 (1966).
26. The uniform version provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962).
27. Montgomery and Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administrationof Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rnv. 803, 807 n.5 (1976).
Because of the nature of the amendments to the uniform version, the third comment
of the official reporter arguably should retain some applicability. The first amendment,
deleting the phrase "who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home," seems simply to broaden the class of third-party beneficiaries. The second
amendment seems only to broaden the category of damages to which warranty protection
is extended. These changes arguably do not negate interpretation of the comment that
the section was intended to extend warranty protection horizontally, but not affect the
case law on vertical privity. But see Bishop v. Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340 (Ala. 1976). In Bishop,
the Alabama Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a certified question from the
District Court of the Northern District of Georgia, whether Alabama's nonuniform version
of § 2-318, ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 2-318 (1965), eliminated the vertical privity requirement
in personal injury actions based on breach of warranty. The court found the comment to
be "inappropriate to the section as enacted in view of Alabama's modified version." 336
So. 2d at 1343. The court reached this conclusion even though Alabama made fewer
changes than did South Carolina. "Aside from immaterial matters of punctuation, its only
change was to drop the limiting language, 'who is in the family or household of the buyer
or who is a guest in his house."' McDonnell, The New Privity Puzzle: ProductsLiability
under Alabama's Uniform Commercial Code, 22 ALA. L. REv. 455, 482 (1970). This seemingly slight change, however, may justify a different interpretation, based on the words
"of his buyer." "His" apparently refers to "seller," and thus the official proposed version
of § 2-318, which contained the language "of his buyer," arguably intended to extend the
warranties of the immediate seller only. The amendment process, by deleting the language
which raises this inference, thereby demonstrates an intent to change the statute-arguably to eliminate the requirement of vertical privity.
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to their literal meaning." The court concluded that "[iln view
of the plain language of the statute and its controlling effect, no
profit can be gained by a long dissertation upon prior decisions
or alleged Reporter's comments as to the statute's meaning.""9 By
holding that the "plain language" of section 36-2-318 allowed
plaintiffs warranty action, notwithstanding the lack of privity,3
the court circumvented the difficult problem of determining the
31
extent of the comments' applicability.
B.

Damages Recoverable by Third-PartyBeneficiaries

Plaintiff in Gasque sought damages only for economic loss,
specifically including increased expenses and lost profits

2

The

issue before the supreme court was whether section 36-2-318,
which extends warranty protection when "person or property is
damaged by breach of the warranty, 3 3 was intended to apply in
an action solely for economic loss. 3 4 The court viewed the question

as one requiring statutory interpretation of "property," and applied the definition it had set forth in Gibbes v. NationalHospital
Services, Inc.31There the South Carolina Supreme Court stated
that 'property' is not confined to tangible or corporeal objects,
but is a word of unusually broad meaning,"36 including "any valuable right or interest considered primarily as a source or element
of wealth, or any civil right of a pecuniary nature."3 Relying on
28. McMillen Feed Mills, Inc. of S.C. v. Mayer, 265 S.C. 500, 510-11, 220 S.E.2d 221,
226 (1975). A corollary rule of statutory construction, which suggests that the court perhaps should have looked to the comments, is that "[a]ll rules of statutory interpretation
are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably
discovered in the language used and that language must be construed in the light of the
intended purpose." Id. at 510-11, 220 S.E.2d at 226 (emphasis added).
29. 270 S.C. at 504, 243 S.E.2d at 832.
30. Id. at 502-03, 243 S.E.2d at 832.
31. Had the court, in reliance upon the comments to § 36-2-318, found that the
statute affected only horizontal privity, Odom v. Ford Motor Company, 230 S.C. 320, 95
S.E.2d 601 (1956), would have remained authority for the necessity of vertical privity. This
interpretation would not have bound the court to the rule of vertical privity, however, for
the court could have followed the approach of Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962), and Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848
(1968), and judicially abolished the judge-made rule.
32. Record at 5 (Amended Complaint of L.B. Gasque).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976).
34. 270 S.C. at 503, 243 S.E.2d at 832.
35. 202 S.C. 304, 24 S.E.2d 513 (1943).
36. Id. at 308, 24 S.E.2d at 514.
37. Id., 24 S.E.2d at 515.
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this very broad definition, the court in Gasque held that
"property damage" included both "diminution in value of the
subject product"" (the difference in value of the product as warranted and as it actually performed), and "consequential
loss of
3' 9
profits occasioned by its defective performance.

Justice Littlejohn, in a brief dissent, rejected the inclusion
of economic loss within the meaning of "property damage." He
concluded that the extension of warranty protection by section
36-2-318 did not eliminate the common-law requirement of contractual privity in actions for economic loss based on breach of
implied warranty. 0
The distinction between "economic loss" and "property
damage" made by Justice Littlejohn is consistent with the view
of commentators," who view economic loss to include inadequate
value of the product itself, repair costs, incidental expenses, and
lost profits; they view property damage, however, to mean
physical harm to property." Policy reasons suggest that the two
forms of damages be treated differently. Once a seller's product
is resold, he loses his ability to foresee where and how his product
will be used. Liability for economic loss, especially lost profits,
might very well make liability exposure inestimable, and thus
render uninsurable the seller who is uncertain who will ultimately
use, consume, or be affected by his product. 3 Component parts
manufacturers are in a particularly untenable position not only
because they are unable to determine for what purposes and for
whom their products will be used, but also because they are unable to ascertain the purposes for which their products could be
used. The component parts manufacturer is faced with an unenviable choice. He must either take commercially unreasonable
risks, make attempts to prevent entry of his products into a jurisdiction with such a broad rule of liability, or curtail a very important form of production. None of the alternatives are individually
or socially desirable.
38. 270 S.C. at 503, 243 S.E.2d at 832.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 504-05, 243 S.E.2d at 833.
41. E.g., J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 332; Note, Economic Loss in
ProductsLiabilityJurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966); see Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Mm. L. REy. 791, 820-23 (1966);
Comment, Manufacturer'sLiability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic Loss" Damage-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1966).
42. J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, supranote 19, at 332; see Note, supranote 41, at 918.
43. J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 19, at 334.
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II. STRICT TORT LIABILITY
A. Liability for Products Deemed Defective
for Lack of Safety Feature
In Marchant v. Mitchell Distributing Co.," Young v. Tide
Craft, Inc.,45 and Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment Co, 4" the
South Carolina Supreme Court focused on whether the absence
of a safety feature or device constituted an unreasonably dangerous defect in a product under section 15-73-10 of the'South Carolina Code. 47 This section is the statutory enactment of strict tort
liability expressed in section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts."
In Marchant, the operator of a crane had failed to release
enough cable to compensate for the distance that he had extended the crane's boom; consequently, the crane "doubleblocked," causing the fall of a "bucket" that the crane was lifting
and in which plaintiff was riding. Plaintiff brought an action to
recover for personal injuries suffered in the fall. He argued that
had a safety feature called an "anti-blocking device" been attached to the crane, the accident would not have occurred and
that therefore the absence of the device constituted an unreasonably dangerous defect.49
In an unanimous opinion the court held that the crane was
not defective." Justice Littlejohn's opinion relied on a New Mexico case, Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper.51 In Skyhook, plaintiff argued
44.
45.
46.
47.

270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977).
270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976). The section provides:
Liability of seller for defective product.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
49. 270 S.C. at 32-34, 240 S.E.2d at 511-12.
50. Id. at 36, 240 S.E.2d at 514.
51. 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
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that the failure of defendant to supply a crane with an "insulated
link" or a "proximity warning device" was an unreasonably dangerous defect that resulted in the electrocution of plaintiff's decedent when the crane contacted an overhead power line.5 2 The test
applied by the court in Skyhook was whether the product, absent
such a feature or device, was unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property. 3 Comment i to section 402A defines an "unreasonably dangerous" product as one which is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Citing this comment, the court in Skyhook concluded that
the crane was not unreasonably dangerous within the contemplation of "the ordinary consumer or user of such a rig."55
Although the court in Marchant reached the conclusion that
the crane was not unreasonably dangerous, it did so without examining the knowledge of the ordinary user of such a crane. The
court, finding that plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of going
forward, stated that
[b]y bringing the action under § 15-73-10, Marchant has
assumed the burden of presenting evidence which tends to prove
that the crane was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous, which proximately caused his injury. The fact that the
injury occurred and the fact that the crane could have been
more safe is not sufficient to support a finding that the crane
was unreasonably dangerous."
Plaintiff's fatal mistake apparently was neglecting to present evidence that defendant's failure to supply an anti-blocking device
resulted, under the definition of "unreasonably dangerous"
stated in Comment i to section 402A, in a danger beyond the
contemplation of the ordinary user.57
52. Id. at 145, 560 P.2d at 936.
53. Id. at 147, 560 P.2d at 938.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTs § 402A, Comment i (1965). The court in Skyhook
further relied on the fact that defendant had placed on the crane's boom a clearly visible
warning against coming within ten feet of high voltage lines. Commentj to § 402A, cited
by the court, supports its finding that defendant could reasonably assume that the warning would be read and heeded, and that since there would have been no danger had the
warning been heeded, the crane was neither in a defective condition nor unreasonably
dangerous.
55. 90 N.M. at 147, 560 P.2d at 938.
56. 270 S.C. at 36, 240 S.E.2d at 514.
57. In Marchant v. Lorain Div. of Koering, S.C.
, 251 S.E.2d 189 (1979),
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The supreme court again applied the Skyhook test in Young
v. Tide Craft, Inc."5 Tide Craft involved actions against the manufacturer of a fishing boat for the wrongful death and conscious
pain and suffering of the boat's purchaser. When the boat developed problems in its steering mechanism, the decedent owner,
Young, took it to a dealer for repairs. The steering cable had
begun to bind, necessitating a rewiring of the system. Unable to
obtain enough wire before Young wanted to use the boat, the
dealer used clamps to splice the cable temporarily. While Young
was operating the boat the cable separated, the boat jerked into
a turn, and Young was ejected. Instead of being thrown clear of

the boat, however, Young caught one of his feet in the lines of the
boat's trolling motor. He was suspended from the side of the boat
in such a position that his head was below the level of the passing
water. Before a nearby boat could swing close enough for a rescuer
to jump on board and stop the motor, Young drowned 5 At trial
the supreme court decided a second case arising from the same facts as Marchant v.
Mitchell, the second suit being against the crane's manufacturer. The court found additional evidence presented in the second suit, lacking in the first, which created a jury issue
on whether the crane was defective.
The crucial evidence was an affidavit from a design engineer, which stated that the
crane's design made double-blocking predictable and that it was foreseeable that men
would be in a bucket carried by the crane when the double-blocking occurred. This
evidence was apparently sufficient to meet plaintiff's "burden of presenting evidence
which tends to prove that the crane was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,"
Marchant v. Mitchell, 270 S.C. at 36, 240 S.E.2d at 514. This burden had not been met
in the earlier case.
By relying on evidence of foreseeability to demonstrate that a product is in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous, the court followed its approach in Kennedy v. Custom
Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 146 (1978) (see text accompanying notes 76-93
infra) and is therefore subject to the criticism advanced against Custom Ice. Reliance on
foreseeability tends to emphasize the level of awareness of the particularuser in determining the existence of a defect in a product rather than measuring the danger by the extent
contemplated by the ordinary consumer, as stated in comment i to § 420A. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment i (1965). Thus, the court in Custom Ice and Lorain
has substituted a subjective test for what properly should be an objective one.
Lorain also reaffirmed the court's position in Marchant v. Mitchell that a distributor
could not be held liable for negligent design. In Marchant v. Mitchell the court held that
the distributor could not be liable for negligent design because he "had nothing to do with
designing or assembling the crane." 270 S.C. 37, 240 S.E.2d 514. The court in Lorain,
noting the distinction between distributor and manufacturer, held that the manufacturer's awareness of the risk of double-blocking raised a jury issue on whether its design
of the crane had been negligent. S.C. , 251 S.E.2d 191.
58. 270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 679.
59. Id. at 458-61, 242 S.E.2d at 673-75.
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defendant manufacturer was held liable on theories of negligent
design and strict tort. 0
The supreme court, with Justice Rhodes writing for the majority, rejected plaintiff's argument that two features of the boat's
design constituted unreasonably dangerous defects. The first, an
alleged propensity of the boat to eject its occupant, was rejected
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
ejection propensity proximately caused death.6' Plaintiff's second
basis for the application of strict tort theory was defendant's
failure to install a kill switch, a safety device designed to stop the
boat's motor if the driver is ejected. The court here applied the
Skyhook test to determine whether the absence of this device
constituted an unreasonably dangerous defect. The court cited
Comment i to section 402A and stated that the test for a defect
"is an objective one and knowledge common to the community
must be attributed to Young.""
The court strayed from this objective standard, however, by
examining Young's particular awareness of the risk posed by the
lack of a kill switch. Finding that Young was experienced with
boats, the court concluded that he had to be aware of the risk;
moreover, because he was aware, the lack of a kill switch did not
constitute an unreasonably dangerous defect. 3 Young's special
awareness of the danger of the lack of a kill switch, although
relevant to the issue of assumption of the risk, 4 properly had no
bearing on the existence of a defect. According to Comment i to
section 402A, which the South Carolina legislature incorporated
as its intent when it adopted strict tort liability,65 the existence
of a defect should be determined in terms of the danger
"contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as its characteristics." 6 Although the court might nevertheless have found
60. Id. at 461, 242 S.E.2d at 675. For discussion of the negligent design issue, see text
accompanying n.106 infra.
61. 270 S.C. at 470, 242 S.E.2d at 679. For discussion of this issue, see Evidence,
Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 31 S.C.L. REV. 73, 79-82 (1979).
62. 270 S.C. at 470-71, 242 S.E.2d at 679-80.
63. Id. at 472, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
64. Assumption of the risk is a statutory defense in South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-73-20 (1976). The statute provides that "[i]f the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (1976).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment i (1965) (emphasis added).
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that the ordinary purchaser of the fishing boat was aware of the
risk presented by its lack of a kill switch, the court should distinguish in future cases between determinations of the existence of7
a defect and determinations of plaintiff's assumption of the risk.1
The legislature, by adopting strict tort liability, including the
comments to section 402A, made sellers liable for sales of products that are unreasonably dangerous according to an objective,
community standard; lowering the standard because of the special knowledge of injured individuals would defeat the legislative
intent.
6" the California Supreme
In Barker v. Lull Engineering,
Court concluded that determining the existence of a defect solely
on the expectations of the ordinary consumer would provide inadequate protection for the consumer." The court adopted a second
test for liability, to be applied even when the product's design
satisfied the ordinary consumer's expectations. A product may
alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury
and the defendant fails to establish that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh its inherent risks. 0
A New York case, Micallef v. Miehle Co., 7' is also illustrative

of the national trend 2 toward allowing recovery even though the
risk of a product is no greater than that perceived by the ordinary
consumer. Taking note of the increasingly complex and technological nature of society, the court concluded that "[a] casting
of increased responsibility upon the manufacturer, who stands in
a superior position to recognize and cure defects, for improper
conduct in the placement of finished products into the channels
of commerce furthers the public interest." 73 The court held that
67. See Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711, 717 (Mont. 1978); Olson v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530, 537-38 (N.D. 1977).
68. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
69. The court stated that it "refus[ed] to permit the low esteem in which the public
might hold a dangerous product to diminish the manufacturer's responsibility for injuries
caused by that product." Id. at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
70. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
71. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
72. E.g., Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Pust v. Union
Supply Co., 561 P.2d 355 (Colo. App. 1976); Blaw-Knox Food & Chemical Equip. Corp.
v. Holmes, 348 So. 2d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Casey v. Gifford Wood Co., 61 Mich.
App. 208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711 (Mont.
1978); Olson v. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
73. 39 N.Y.2d at 385, 348 N.E.2d at 577, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
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a manufacturer could be liable for a product designed with an
unreasonable risk of harm, even though the product's defect was
latent. 4 The court thereby reversed the bar to recovery for latent
defects which it had enunciated in Campo v. Scofield.75
The South Carolina Supreme Court decisions in Marchant
and Tide Craft are contrary to the trend exemplified by Barker
and Micallef. By reversing judgments on the basis of the factual
issue of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous according
to the expectations of the ordinary consumer, the supreme court
may be applying such a low level of consumer expectation as to
undermine the policies behind the creation of strict tort liability.
In Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment Co., 7 the supreme

court was faced with allegations similar to those in Marchantand
Tide Craft that the failure to install a safety device caused a
product to be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when sold. Defendant designed and sold commercial ice makers.
Plaintiff was instructed by his employer, Georgetown Ice Co., to
us a garden hoe to dislodge jammed ice from the machinery.
When the hoe caught on a conveyor, plaintiff was drawn into the
conveyor and severely injured. Plaintiff brought suit on theories
of negligent design and strict tort, alleging that the failure to
install a protective shield caused the injury. The supreme court
affirmed a verdict for plaintiff on both theories. 77
Justice Gregory, writing for a unanimous court, stated that
the test to determine whether a product is defective when sold is
"whether the product is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer
or user given the conditions and circumstances that will foreseeably attend the use of the product. ' 78 Defendant had argued that
the conveyor was not defective when installed, but had been rendered defective by the construction of a catwalk which enabled
workers to reach high enough to dislodge jammed ice. The court
held, however, that because of evidence submitted at trial that
defendant had actual knowledge of the construction and use of
similar catwalks in other ice plants, the jury could have found
that the use of a catwalk by plaintiff was "a foreseeable circumstance that required the incorporation of protective shields in the
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978).
Id. at 174-77, 246 S.E.2d at 177-79.
Id. at 176, 246 S.E.2d at 178.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/10

12

1979]

Brockington: Products Liability
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY

design of the conveyor." 79
The court's foreseeability approach was derived from Mickle
v. Blackmon,0 perhaps the leading products liability case in
South Carolina. In Mickle, plaintiff was injured in an automobile
collision when the protective knob on the gearshift lever shattered
and plaintiff was impaled on the lever. Defendant argued that its
only duty was to manufacture a product reasonably fit for its
intended use, and that the intended use of its automobile did not
include colliding with other vehicles.8 The court in Mickle, drawing on the approach of the Fourth Circuit in Spruill v. BoyleMidway, Inc., 2 found that "intended use" is but an adaptation
of foreseeability and held that the seller or manufacturer must
anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of his
product.3
The Custom Ice decision fell well within the Mickle rule
when it held that defendant should have anticipated the risk of
injury because of its knowledge of the use of catwalks; however,
the decision did not follow the analysis of Skyhook Corp. v.
Jasper,84 on which the court had relied in both Marchant v.
Mitchell Distributing Co.85 and Young v. Tide Craft, Inc. 8
Skyhook stated that to be defective a product lacking a safety
feature or device must be unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. 7 The user or consumer to be considered is the ordinary
one who would purchase the product, and who is deemed to have
the ordinary knowledge common to the community regarding the
product's characteristics.8 As the court recognized in Tide Craft,
this test is objective.8 9 In Custom Ice the court did not expressly
apply the Skyhook test but it may have assumed from several
facts that because of plaintiff's lack of knowledge, the conveyor
absent a protective shield was unreasonably dangerous. In its
statement of the facts, the court noted that this was plaintiff's
79.
80.
(1969).
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173, appealed afterremand 255 S.C. 136, 177 S.E.2d 548

252 S.C. at 228-29, 166 S.E.2d at 184.
308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
252 S.C. at 233, 166 S.E.2d at 187.
90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977).
270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
90 N.M. at 147, 560 P.2d at 938.
88. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
89. 270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
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first job, that he was fifteen-years old, and that the injury occurred on his third day on the job and his first day on the catwalk."0 Although the court did not mention the issue, it may have
relied, as it did in Tide Craft, on plaintiffs level of awareness of
the risk in determining whether the conveyor was unreasonably
dangerous." In Custom Ice the court noted testimony that it was
a common practice at other ice plants to dislodge ice with a
garden hoe; 2 this fact raised the possibility that most users of the
product were aware of its risk, but avoided the risk by exercise of
caution. Despite the fact that it based its conclusion on the special awareness of the risk by the plaintiff, the court found in Tide
Craft that as a matter of law there was no defect. 3 If in Custom
Ice the court had examined the extent of danger contemplated by
the ordinary user of the ice machine and conveyor and concluded
that the actual danger was not beyond the contemplated danger,
then the same result as in Tide Craft would have been warranted.
B. Retrospective Application of Strict
Tort Liability
The supreme court continued to refuse to rule on the applicability of strict tort liability to causes of action arising before the
legislative enactment of section 402A94 in 1974. In 1976, in Lane
v. Trenholm Bldg. Co.,95 the court stated in a footnote that "the
General Assembly also recognized the clear drift of the common
law in this State when it codified Restatement of Torts (2) Section 402A. "" Subsequent to Lane, however, the court has refused
to state definitively whether strict tort liability is applicable to
causes of action arising prior to its legislative enactment." In
90. 271 S.C. at 173-74, 246 S.E.2d at 177.

91. See text at notes 63-67 supra.
92. 271 S.C. at 175, 246 S.E.2d at 178.
93. 270 S.C. at 472, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).

95. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
96. Id. at 504 n.3, 229 S.E.2d at 731 n.3.
97. Three theories exist for retroactive application of strict tort liability. First, as the
court intimated in Lane, strict tort may have already been a part of the state's common

law by the time it was statutorily enacted. A second possibility is that the enactment of
§ 402A was remedial and therefore can be applied retrospectively. This conclusion was
reached in dicta by a federal court in Cooley v. Salopian Industries, Ltd., 383 F. Supp.

1114, 1118 (D.S.C. 1974). For an analysis of this issue in Cooley, see Torts, Annual Survey
ol South Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L. Rav. 616-19 (1975). A third possibility, which the

supreme court alluded to in Marchant v. Mitchell Distributing Co., 270 S.C. 29, 38, 240
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Marchant v. Mitchell DistributingCo. 8 the court had before it a
cause of action which had occurred prior to the 1974 enactment.
By ruling that the product was not defective9 the court circumvented the question whether strict tort was applicable.
In Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,'00 the court again relegated its
comments to a footnote, stating that "we do not decide, nor do
we intimate, whether strict liability has any applicability prior to
enactment of § 15-73-10."'' In his dissent, 0 2 however, Justice
Ness indicated that he would apply strict tort liability to a cause
of action which arose before section 402A was enacted. Justice
0 3
Ness stated that he would affirm the result of the trial court,1
which was based in the alternative on strict tort.0 4 He cited Lane,
an opinion he authored, and echoed its language: "[L]egislative
enactment [of section 402A] was consonant with the clear draft
[sic] of the common law of this State as reflected in the decisions
'0
of this Court.'

5

I.

INTERVENING CAUSES

In Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.,'"8 plaintiff brought an action in
negligence'0 for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering. ' Plaintiff alleged that defendant-manufacturer Tide Craft,
Inc., negligently designed the boat's steering system, negligently
allowed installation of the system by dealers, and negligently
failed to warn against improper repair methods. 9 Defendant reS.E.2d 511, 514 (1977), is that the statute might be retroictive, and therefore have retrospective application. Although the court did not answer the question, if forced to do so
it might rely on the test it stated in Hyder v. Jones, 271 S.C. 85, 245 S.E.2d 123 (1978).
There the court noted that in "the construction of statutes there is a presumption that
statutory enactments are to be considered prospective rather than retroactive in operation
unless there is a specific provision or clear legislative intent to the contrary." Id. at 8788, 245 S.E.2d at 125.
98. 270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977).
99. Id. at 33, 38, 240 S.E.2d at 512, 514.
100. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
101. Id. at 472 n.1, 242 S.E.2d at 680 n.1.
102. Id. at 472, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
103. Id. at 477, 242 S.E.2d at 682.
104. Id. at 461, 242 S.E.2d at 675.
105. Id. at 477, 242 S.E.2d at 682.
106. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d at 671 (1978).
107. Id. at 461, 242 S.E.2d at 675. There were also causes of action in strict tort and
breach of implied warranty. For discussion of strict tort in Tide Craft, see text accompanying notes 58-67 supra.
108. 270 S.C. at 458, 242 S.E.2d at 673.
109. Id. at 462, 242 S.E.2d at 675.
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sponded that the act of the dealer who spliced the steering cable
of Young's boat was an intervening cause terminating defendant's
liability."0
The supreme court applied a two-part test in determining
whether the act of the dealer broke the causal chain. The first
determination was whether the dealer's act was a probable consequence of the defendant's negligence. After reviewing evidence
that the practice of splicing steering cables was known both commonly and by the particular dealer to be dangerous, the court
concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the choice
of a dangerous repair method was unforeseeable. Because the
dealer's act was unforeseeable, the court reached the second portion of the test, which was whether the injury would have occurred in natural course absent the act of the dealer."' The ev dence indicated that although the boat's steering system could
bind and prevent steering, without the splicing it was highly improbable that the cable would snap and cause a sudden change
in course. The court concluded that the only reasonable inference
was that the injury would not have occurred absent the intervening act of the dealer."'
A similar issue arose in Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment
3
Co." Defendant Ice Company argued that the construction of a
catwalk by plaintiff's employer constituted an intervening cause
because without it the height of the conveyor made it unforeseeable that anyone could come close enough to be injured. In response, the court noted that plaintiff presented evidence at trial
that indicated defendant was aware that the construction and use
of catwalks was common. The court concluded that since there
was conflicting evidence about whether defendant could foresee
the subsequent act of construction of the catwalk, the issue of
proximate cause was properly submitted to the jury."' Although
the court in Custom Ice did not rely on the two-part analysis it
applied in Tide Craft, it certainly could have for its approach was
entirely consistent.
The first of the two steps, determining whether the subsequent act of another was a probable consequence of defendant's
110. Id. at 463, 242 S.E.2d at 676.

111. Id. at 465, 242 S.E.2d at 677.
112. Id. at 466, 242 S.E.2d at 677.
113. 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978).

114. 271 S.C. at 175, 246 S.E.2d at 178.
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negligence, is consistent with the view of Prosser. Prosser's expression of the test is whether "the intervening cause is one which
in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or
one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances . .1.1."I5 Application of either expression
of the test to the facts of Custom Ice yields an affirmative response-that defendant, knowing of other catwalks, should have
anticipated the negligence of plaintiffs employer in building his
catwalk." 6 Thus, Custom Ice is a classic case for imposition of
continued responsibility on an actor who sets a force in motion,
knowing of the reasonable likelihood that an independent agency
will subsequently operate to actualize the risk created by the
actor."'
Joseph S. Brockington
115. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 272 (4th ed. 1971).
116. Because this first step of the analysis is answered affirmatively, there is no need
to reach the second step. See Tide Craft, 270 S.C. at 463-64, 242 S.E.2d at 676.
117. See W. PRossER, supra note 115, at 272-75. Prosser's leading example is of an
actor who starts a fire; the actor "may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual, and
customary wind will spread" the fire. Id. at 272.
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